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INJUNCTIVE CONTROL OF FAMILY RELATIONS.
This paper is a discussion of the use of the injunction to
regulate and control family relations, involving husband and
wife and infants.' This includes among other things, the more
basic problem as to whether equity has jurisdiction to protect
purely personal rights by injunction in the absence of any
"property rights" upon which to base the relief. First, the
leading cases will be examined at some length. Then a construc-
tive analysis of the several questions involved will be attempted.
I. W HERE RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND ANrD WIFE ARE
INVOLVED.
The leading case of Vanderbilt -. Mitchell,2 while insisting
that the technical basis of an injunction given by the court
against the use of a fraudulent birth certificate was the protec-
tion of property rights, goes far by way of persuasive dictum
in recognizing the fact that an individual has rights other than
property rights, which a court of equity should protect.
In that case the defendant, the wife of plaintiff, was living
in adultery with a third person, and as a result of such adulter.
ous intercourse, a child was born. She had fraudulently in-
duced a physician to believe that plaintiff was the father of
the child, and caused him to insert such fraudulent statement
in the birth certificate required by the laws of New Jersey.
The certificate had been recorded, and under a statute a certified
'The following citations will be found helpful in a consideration
of this problem: Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights,
Long, 33 Yale L. J. 115, 126; Equitable Relief Against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality, Pound, 29 Har. L. Rev. 640, 668; The Progress
of the Law, Equitable Relief Against Torts, Chafee, 34 Ear. L. Rev.
388, 407 et seq.; Principles of Equity, Clark, sec. 241; The Change
In the Meaning of Consortium, Evans Holbrook, 22 MIch. L. Rev. 1;
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), sec. 99.
272 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304 (1907); 21
Har. L. Rev. 54.
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copy might be used as prima facie evidence of the facts therein
set forth. The plaintiff alleged that under such fraudulent cer-
tificate the defendant sought to claim for the child all the rights
of a legitimate son of the plaintiff: Suit -was brought for the can-
cellation of the fraudulent certificate and to enjoin the mother
and child from claiming for the child the status of a lawfully
begotten child of the plaintiff.
The court, in granting the prayer of the plaintiff, insisted
that the technical basis of the jurisdiction it was exercising was
the protection of property rights. Because of the fraudulent
certificate, plaintiff would be prima facie liable for the support
and maintenance of the infant. At his death the certificate
would become evidence upon the question as to who should in-
herit his property. If it became impossible, for several reasons,
to rebut this prima facie liability, it would become fixed. These
reasons furnish sufficient grounds upon which to base the hold-
ing in the case.
But the court seized the opportunity to utter a dictun. In
addition to the threatened property damage there was an
injury to the plaintiff's personality. The use of his name by
a bastard child, the usurpation of the status which a legitimate
son would occupy-these constituted serious personal injuries, as
well as injuries to property. The court signified its willingness
to give relief for these personal injuries, as such, had it been
necessary, saying:
"If it appeared in this case that only the complainant's status and
personal rights were thus threatened or thus invaded by the action
of the defendants and by the filing of the false certificate, we should
hold, and without hesitation, that an individual has rights, other -than
property rights, which he can enforce in a court of equity and which
a court of equity will enforce against invasion. And we should de-
clare that the complainant was entitled to relief. . . . In many
cases courts have striven to uphold the equitable jurisdiction upon the
ground of some property right, however slender and shadowy, and the
tendency of the courts is to afford more adequate protection to per-
sonal rights, and to that end to lay hold of slight circumstances tend-
ing to show a technical property right."'
However, in the end the court insisted that the technical
basis of the decision was the protection of property rights, and
expressly said that whether the bill might not have rested on
personal rights alone was not decided, since the case presented
a Ibid. 100.
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the property feature sufficiently to rest the decision wholly on
that.
The case is a good illustration of one method of growth of
the law. The case rests solely and wholly on precedent, but per-
suasive dictum is inserted indicating the path for future
decisions. This, if worthy, exerts a powerful influence on sub-
sequent decisions. That was the result of the dictum in the
instant case.
A leading case involving the jurisdiction of equity to pro-
tect an individual interest in a domestic relation is Ex parte
Warfield.4 In that case a husband sued for damages for partial
alienation of his wife's affections and asked the court to enjoin
the defendant from future association with her. The court
granted the injunction and the defendant having violated it,
was committed for contempt and brought a habeas corputs pro-
ceeding, claiming that the court had not had jurisdiction to
grant the injunction. It was held that the court had such juris-
diction, both under the inherent power of the court of equity
and under the broad Texas statute relating to injunctions. The
right to services and consortium are mentioned, but it is difficult
to determine just how much these factors influenced the
decision. Of course these were sufficient to ground an injunc-
tion upon, as upon the protection of a property right, but appar-
ently the court was willing to and did in this case, protect per-
sonal rights as such. This conclusion is based upon the language
of the opinion in various places, as for example the following:
"The growth of the principles of equity in this regard have been
greatly enlarged, so that it may be said that where a court of equity
-has jurisdiction of the case, and a party shows that he is liable to
suffer injury by some act threatened or that may be done pending the
litigation, whether this has regard to property in issue or to some
-personal right dependent upon some personal act or conduct, the court
will grant the writ. In such case, it cannot be said that the court
lacks the power, although in doubtful cases it may refrain from the
exercise of such power."'
The statute, which the court construed as giving wide
power to equity courts in granting injunctions, weakens this
decision, but the language of the opinion indicates that the
court considered it would have reached a like result in the
4 40 Tex. Crim. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899).
"Ibid. 937. Cf. also comment on case, The Progress of the Law,
Ohafee, 34 Har. L. Rev. 388, 413.
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absence of statute, the court saying, "this would be so under
the liberal rules of equity, as now practiced in the courts,"
but more so under the provisions of the Texas statute. So we
conclude, that although the court had both the protection of
property rights and the provisions of a broad statute as a basis
for the injunction, it was willing to protect the personal rights
involved, as such.
Two cases which have several common features and reach a
similar result will now be examined. These cases, Hodecker v.
Stricker 6 and Snedaker v. King 7 represent a more conservative
attitude than is apparent in Ex parte Warfield. In these cases
injunctions were refused. In Ex parte Warfield one was
granted.
In Hodecker v. Stricker, the plaintiff was the wife of
Hodecker. The defendant was living with .Hodecker in immoral
and meretricious relations, and had appropriated his surname,
which prejudiced plaintiff's standing in the community. There
was no allegation of slander or libel, nor was it charged that
the defendant had alienated from the plaintiff the affections of
her husband. Apparently then, the plaintiff did not intend to
allege any damage to property as such, but based her action
solely upon the charge, that the defendant had usurped the
name, which the plaintiff alone, as Hodecker's wife, was entitled
to bear, and that this was an "assault upon the identity and
individuality of the plaintiff, distressing to her." The court
considered that the case rested upon the pl6adings, upon injury
to personality. An injury to property could have been found,
but the court considered that the plaintiff alleged an injury
to personality alone. The question therefore was directly
raised in the opinion of the court, as to whether the court would
protect personality as such. The court refused to do so and
suggested that the proper mode of relief for the plaintiff was by
-way of the divorce court. That would remove from her the
name of Hodecker, and the distressing and humiliating gosip
which the defendant's use 'of that name entailed.
In Snedaker v. King, decided twenty years after Hodecker
v. Stricker, and in another jurisdiction, a wife again was pro-
39 N. Y. Sup. 515 (1896).
111 Ohio 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924). See comments on case in 38
liar. U. Rev. 396; 34 Yale L. J. 327; 9 Minn. L. Rev. 283; 1 Cin. L. Rev.
101.
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ceeding against her husband's paramour. This tilne she asked
that the defendant be restrained from associating with, going
near, or communicating with her husband. It is at once appar-
ent that the property right to a husband's consortium, which
was no longer desired in the Hodecker case, was directly raised
in the Snedaker case. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was attempting to take away from the wife her hus-
band's support. On such allegations, it would have been easy,
had the court thought it expedient, to have found an injury to
property upon which to base an injunction. However, the court
refused to do so. The following excerpt from the per curiam
opinion illustrates the attitude of the court and its reasons for
refusing to affirm the injunction granted by the lower court:
"The decree In this case is an extreme instance of government by
injunction. It attempts to govern, control, and direct personal rela-
tions and domestic affairs. Among other restrictions placed upon the
defendant by this decree is that of remaining away from any place
where plaintiff's husband may be, and from interfering with plain-
tiff's efforts to communicate with her husband, and with her efforts to
regain his love, esteem, support and conjugal relation. It 'would be
only a little more extreme if the husband had been made a party de-
fendant, and a mandatory Injunction decreed requiring him to dis-
charge all the duties of companionship, affection, love and all other
duties, legal and moral, assumed by him when he entered the conjugal
relation."
Manifestly, the result in the Snedaker case is based upon
a conclusion that it-would be inexpedient or ineffective for a
court of equity, assuming that it had the power, to attempt to
control and enforce conjugal relations by the use of an injunc-
tion. The court considered that even if it could enforce its
decree, which was doubtful, it was just as doubtful if any
beneficial results could be effected.
In Bauman v. Bauman 8 the plaintiff's husband had obtained
a purported divorce from her in Mexico and had subsequently
married the defendant, Ray Starr Einstein, in Connecticut.
The plaintiff obtained a declaratory judgment establishing her
status as lawful wife of Bauman and declaring the Mexican
divorce and Connecticut marriage null and void. Plaintiff
also sought to enjoin the defendant, Ray Starr Einstein, from
continuing to assume the name Bauman, and to restrain both
her and Bauman from representing that they were husband and
$165 N. E. (N. Y.) 819 (1929). See comments on the case in 17
Cal. L. Rev. 681; 29 Col. L. Rev. 2nl3.
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wife. The appellate court expressly affirmed the holding of the
lower court that the divorce and marriage were void. However,
although it considered that the conduct of the defendants was
reprehensible, it refused to grant injunctive relief. The court
considered that the declaratory judgment protected the plain-
tiff in whatever property rights she may have had because of
the matrimonial status, and refused to protect the purely per-
sonal rights which remained. In particular, the court insisted
that the only injury alleged was an injury to plaintiff's feelings,
and that an injunction would not be granted to prevent such an
injury. Such reasoning leads to a result which refuses to give
protection to full personality, making it unnecessary to decide
whether the relief is expedient or not.
In family relations, where a third party is interfering with
the marital relationship, there are several questions which a
court of equity will find it necessary to consider in deciding a
case. First, is there a right involved, which finds any sort of
protection in our legal system? If the court answers this ques-
tion in the affirmative, it is then necessary to consider, second,
will a particular division of our legal system, equity, lend its
aid in protecting this right? The answer to this second proposi-
tion is dependent upon at least three points:
(1) Is the remedy at law adequate?
(2) Is there a property right involved?
(3) Assuming that all these hurdles have been sur-
mounted, is it expedient to grant -relief by injunction?
This analysis will now be considered more in detail.
First, is there a right involved, which finds any sort of pro-
tection in our legal system?
A husband is entitled to his wife's services and society. It
follows that he has a right of action against one who deprives
him of them.9 Nor is it necessary that the wife be enticed to
leave him. The husband has an action for alienation of her
affections, although she has not left his house and although he
9 Tiffany on Domestic Relations (3d ed.) sec. 45 and cases cited in
note 80; Saton v. Milburn, 180 Ky. 655, 203 S. W. 529 (1918); Modica v.
Martino, 207 XI. Y. Sup. 479 (1925); Deming v. Leising, 212 N. Y. Sup.
213 (1925); Pugsley v. Smyth, 98 Ore. 448, 194 Pac. 686 (1921); Har-
ringer v. Keenan, 117 Wash. 311, 201 Pac. 316 (1921).
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does not show any actual pecuniary loss.10 This is true even in
states where it is provided by statute that the earnings of the
wife shall be her separate property. There remains to the
husband the technical right to services rendered in the house-
hold or in the business of the husband.1
Such an action was likely based originally upon loss of ser-
vices, it being presumed that by the alienation of her affections
her services were rendered less valuable. To a certain extent
this was a fiction; to a certain extent it was true.
But whatever may have been the basis of the original action,
the modern action is based largely upon the loss to the husband
of his wife's consortium, services being of less and less value
to the husband as the emancipation of woman continues.
Modern married women's statutes have not lessened the hus-
band's right to his wife's consortium, her society, companion-
ship, conjugal affection, and aid. Anyone who alienates the
wife's affections is bound to lessen the value of these to the
husband. For such an injury an action lies.
And in most jurisdictions the wife is allowed a similar
action.12 Of course, her action cannot be based upon loss of
services, but well considered cases reason that "inasmuch as the
husband has the right to sue for the loss of consortium of the
wife, there can be no intelligent reason why she should not pos-
sess the right to sue for the loss of the society, companionship,
affection and protection of the husband, which the law has vouch-
safed to her."13
The difficulty in permitting the wife to sue at common
law for alienation of the affections of her husband was largely
procedural. Under the common law the identity of the wife
was considered to be merged in that of her husband; she could
bring no action without joining him, and any damages she
might recover would belong to him. Consequently it was most
difficult to attempt to work out an action for the wife in this
'Tiffany op. cit. supra note 9, sec. 45 and cases cited in note 81;
see note 44 A. L. R. 845.
"Ibid. sec. 48 and cases cited in note 7.
"Ibid. sec. 46 and cases cited in note 98; McCurdy's Cases on Do-
mestic Relations, cases cited in note 2, page 818; Madden's Cases on
Domestic Relations, cases cited in note 9, page 381; Woodson v. .Bailey,
210 Ala. 568, 98 So. 809 (1924); Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, 111
Atl. 869 (1920); Rott v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N. W. 294 (1916).
"Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792, 794 (1892).
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type of situation. But whatever the position of the wife may
have been under the common law, it would seem that under
modern statutes, which have largely destroyed the fiction of the
unity of the husband and wife, giving her the control of her
property and the right to sue in her own name, there can no
longer be any valid reason for denying the wife an action for
alienation of her husband's affections. And such is the pre-
vailing rule.
Having found that a right is involved, which finds protec-
tion in our legal system, namely an action to either spouse at
law for alienation of the affections of the other, we will now
examine the second question in our analysis.
Second, will a particular division of our legal system,
equity, lend its aid in protecting this right? In considering
this question there are three points to be discussed.
(1) Is the remedy at law adequate?
The remedy at law is obviously inadequate.14 Of course
either spouse has an action at law for damages. But damages
are a poor palliative for loss of consortium and the continued
shame and humiliation which the complaining party necessarily
feels. In this type of case money is often little desired. The
undisturbed enjoyment of the marital relationship, unmolested
by the wrongful interference of the defendant, is the only relief
which is adequate. As suggested by Buck, J., in Smith v.
Wontacke, 15 in considering whether the wife should have a
right to ask for an injunction in such a case, to hold that dam-
ages are an adequate remedy "would be tantamount to holding
that one who had a home, with carefully tilled crops on it, ready
for harvest, would have the right to sue in damages an enemy
who was seeking to destroy a dam or dyke, and thereby let the
floods inundate such farm and crops and utterly destroy them,
but would not have the capacity or right to prevent such acts
by an injunction. "
16
Nor is it sufficient to say to the complaining spouse that if
he no longer desires the humiliation he can get a divorce. A
divorce is not an adequate remedy. He does not want to sever
the marital relationship. He wants to continue it." 17
1419 Ill. L. Rev. 587.
271 S. W. 209 (Texas, 1925).
"Ibid. 212.
IT See generally 29 Har. L. Rev. 640, 668 ff.
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(2) Is there a property right involved?
Is the jurisdiction of equity confined to securing rights of
property? In the past this has not even been considered a
moot question, for since Gee v. Pritchard 1 - courts of equity
have considered that their jurisdiction was limited to the pro-
tection of rights of property, and that rights of personality were
without the pale of relief. Although there is no substantial
reason today for such limitation,19 and although able writ-
ers have argued to the contrary,20 this is still, apparently, the
prevailing rule, with cases showing a tendency to relax it to be
found in the books, but not in any great number. So it is well
to consider whether there is a property right to be protected
in the cases under discussion.
Although the right of the husband to his wife's services is
now thoroughly "moribund for all substantial purposes," it
still has sufficient vitality to constitute a- property to be
protected, if the courts desire to find one in a suit by the hus-
band. But it is not necessary to use this particular right in order
to secure a right of property to be protected. Each spouse is
entitled to the consortium of the other. This right is recognized
as an element of the marriage contract, and is a right of prop-
erty. Any person who interferes with it must respond in dam-
ages, as we have learned. This right to consortium is fully suf-
ficient to ground an injunction upoh, as upon the protection of
a property right, if the court desires to follow the historical
rule.2 1
Suppose though, that the plaintiff fails to allege injury to
'2 Swanst. 402 (1818).
",Clark, Principles of Equity, 314.
2Roscoe Pound, op. cit. supra n. 17, 640.
n "It requires no argument or citations of authority to show that
the marriage relation is based on civil contract. It follows as the night
follows the day, that the parties to such a contract are entitled to pro-
tection against unlawful interference with the obligations of that con-
tract on the part of third persons. If this action were for damages
alone, instead of damages and injunction, it would be conceded on all
sides that the wife is entitled to maintain an action to recover a money
judgment for any damages she may have suffered. It is equally well
settled that the wife would be entitled to compensation, not only for
loss of support, as alleged in the petition and as found by the trial
court, but that she would also be entitled to recover damages for loss
of consortium. Both of these elements are recognized as elements of
the marriage contract and as rights of property." (Italics are ours).
Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio 225, 145, N. E. 15, 19 (1924), dissenting
opinion of Marshall, C. J.
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services or consortium. This was true in the Hodecker case.22
Is it possible for the court to find a property interest to pro-
tect other than the rights to services or consortium? The dis-
senting opinions in the Bauman case lend us aid in considering
this question.23
It is there suggested by Crane and O'Brien, JJ., that the
marriage relationship creates a "status." This status is more
than a personal relationship. Created by consent of the par-
ties, sanctioned by law, it may be considered a "property
right" which is entitled to the protection of the law. The fact
that we consider the marital status as a property right does not
affect the fact that it remains a personal relationship. We are
not put to a choice that it is a personal relationship on the one
hand, or that it is a property right on the other. Personal and
property interests of husband and wife are merged in this re-
lationship. It is really a union of such rights. It is no great
extension in the law to consider the marital relationship a suf-
ficient property to be entitled to the protection of equity, if it
is desired to follow the historical rule that equity protects only
property rights.
Whether equity secures purely personal rights by injunc-
tive relief has now apparently become a moot question. As
suggested above,24 equity courts have considered in the past
that they had jurisdiction only when the protection of prop-
erty rights was involved. The trend is apparently in the di-
rection of an extention of that rule. However, it is considered
by the writer that a discussion of that most interesting question
is not necessary in the husband and wife cases involving family
relations, and so a consideration of it will be reserved for a sub-
sequent paper on the "right of privacy," where it is not only
apropos but necessary.
It is true that a court of equity could consider the ques-
tion in the type of case under discussion, but it should not be
necessary to do so. The historical rule that equity protects only
property rights can be followed in any case, if the court is at
all flexible-minded. As suggested, supra, if injury to the right
to services or consortium is alleged, the court has before it a
22See note 6 supra.
23Bauman v. Bauman, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
11 Supra n. 18.
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property right entitled to protection, if expedient. If there is
a mere general allegation of injury to the marital relationship,
there is a property right in the "status" upon which to base
the injunction. If a situation should arise where injury to
consortium was not alleged and where the court did not desire
to consider that there was a "property right" to be protected
in the marital status, it would be' necessary for the court to
decide whether it desired to protect purely personal rights, as
such, by injunction. As to whether it would care to do so would
be highly conjectural at the present state in the progress of the
law on this question.
(3) Is it expedient to grant relief by injunction?
The feasibility of attempting to control domestic affairs in-
volving the husband and wife by injunction is questionable.
There are several points to be considered.
(a) The difficulty of enforcement of the decree.
It is hard to understand why an insuperable difficulty in en-
forcing such a decree should be encountered by the court. Con-
tempt proceedings are the proper method of enforcing injunc-
tive process and can be used here as readily as elsewhere. This
phase of the problem is not peculiar to this situation. Nor
should the court be concerned about securing information of
possible infractions of the injunction. A jealous wife or hus-
band would be an untiring agent of the court in this situation.
Until this point in this study, it has been possible to over-
come all difficulties which would prevent relief. But difficul-
ties to relief are. now encountered which make such injunctions
inexpedient except in rare cases.
(b) The doubtful beneficial, results to be obtained.
Looking at the matter from the broad attitude of public
policy, it is doubtful whether the beneficial results obtained jus-
tify the use of the injunction in such cases. Can the court ef-
fectively control marital relations by the use of injunctions? It
is true that the court can say to the paramour, "Hands off."
And while it cannot effectively say to the defendant, "Render
to your spouse those personal services which the marital rela-
tionship calls for," it can say negatively to him, "Do not ren-
der them to another." Sometimes this negative relief has been
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found to be effective in cases of the type of Ltumley v. Wagner.2 5
But it is doubtful whether it is good policy for the court to
render such relief in this type of cases. Should the court at-
tempt to force two people to continue the marital relationship
when one of them emphatically desires to discontinue it? After
all arguments pro and con are considered, is it not perhaps bet-
ter to adopt a policy of hands off in equity and leave the par-
ties to either a reconciliation or the remedial relief of a divorce?
Perhaps, after all, a divorce is the best relief for an eclipsed
marital relationship. Perhaps that is the best solution from
the standpoint of society, the parties, and even the children, if
any. While not an "adequate" remedy, it may be the most
"practical" one. That appears to be the attitude manifested
in the Snedaker and Bauman cases.2 6
(c) The inherent danger of such decrees.
Is it wise to make it a part of the province of equity to
administer paternal relief in domestic affairs of this character?
" 1 DeG., M. & G. 604 (1852). In this leading case the defendant
contracted to sing for the plaintiff, and not elsewhere, for a certain
number of nights. She broke her contract and was about to sing for
another. The court restrained her from singing elsewhere on the
ground that although it was impossible to compel her to sing, it might
"thus possibly compel her to fulfill -her engagement." This enforcement
of the negative covenant gave the court an opportunity to do nega-
tively what it was not feasible to do affirmatively.
"Cf., Witte v. Baucerer (Tex. Civ. Appl.), 255 S. W. 1016 (1923),
where the court enjoined the defendant from having anything to do
with plaintiff's wife, except in such way as necessary in her discharge
of her duties as bookkeeper for the defendant. It is interesting to
speculate upon the success the court would have in enforcing such an
injunction. The decision cannot be said to be based upon any grounds
"except the outraged feelings of the court, which cited no law, gave
no reasons, but preached a good sermon in one paragraph." It is im-
possible to determine how much the Texas statute mentioned in Ex
parte Warfield, 50 S. W. 933 (1899) influenced the decision, since the
court did not mention it in the opinion.
Cf. also, Hall v. Smith, 140 N. Y. Sup. 796 (1913), where the court
although refusing to give an injunction in the instant case because of
laches, said that it did not doubt "that in a proper case the right to
grant an injunction resided in a court of equity", under such circum-
stances. The court was not -specific as to what would constitute a
'"proper case."
Cf. also, Hawks v. Yancey (Tex. Civ. App.), 265 S. W. 233 (1924),
where the court granted an injunction to protect a woman from a man
with whom she had had illicit relations from making statements about
her, imposing himself upon her, preventing her marriage, and from
making false charges concerning her to public officials. The injury to
her business as a nurse, furnish a property right to be protected, it
might be suggested.
218
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There are limits of effective legal action. It can well be argued
that attempts to govern too closely the morals of people by in-
junction will only result in making the courts which grant
such decrees ridiculous and so injure the structure of the whole
legal system. Regulation beyond a certain limit is dangerous.
Perhaps the high office of the injunction should not be stulti-
fied by permitting a resort to it in such cases.
This danger was emphasized by Ex-President Coolidge in
his address before the American Bar Association in San Fran-
cisco at the annual meeting in 1922. His remarks on the limi-
tations of law are applicable to the point under discussion:
"Behind very many of these enlarging activities lies the untenable
theory that there is some short-cut to perfection. It is conceived that
there can be a horizontal elevation of the standards of the nation, im-
mediate and perceptible, by the simple device of new laws. This has
never been the case in human experience. Progress is slow and the re-
sult of a long and arduous process of self-discipline. It is not con-
ferred upon the people, it comes from the people. In a republic the
law reflects rather than makes the standard of conduct and the state
of public opinion. Real reform does not begin with a law, it ends with
a law. The attempt to dragoon the body when the need is to convince
the soul will end only in revolt.
"Under the attempt to perform the impossible there sets in a gen-
eral disintegration. . . . The law, . . . loses its sanctity and
authority. A continuation of this condition opens the road to chaos."(Italics are ours.)"
Therefore, it is concluded, that although it is possible for
the court to enforce its decree, it is doubtful whether it would
be good policy to grant an injunction in most cases. First, it is
doubtful if the injunction, assuming it is enforced, will better
the relations between the plaintiff and his spouse. Second, such
an extension in the use of the injunction may be dangerous to the
structure of our whole legal system as an attempt to go too far
in the control of personal affairs.
It is true that recent cases denying relief have con-
tained strong dissenting opinions; but dissenting opinions do
not make law. Neither do they always mark the future course
of it. As to whether they do in this instance remains for future
decisions to disclose.2 8
"'The Limitations of Law, Calvin Coolidge, Reports of American
Bar Association, Vol. 47, pages 270, 276 (1922).
"See 19 Ill. L. Rev. 587; 34 Yale L. J. 327.
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II. CASES INVOLVING INFANTS
The jurisdiction of a court of equity over the person as
well as over the property of infants has long been recognized.
As stated in the case of New York Life Insurance Company v.
Bangs,2 9 such jurisdiction "originated in the prerogative of
the Crown, arising from its general duty as parens patriae to
protect persons who have no other rightful protector. But
partaking, says Story, as the prerogative does, more of the na-
ture of a judicial administration of rights and duties in foro
conscientiae than of a strict executive authority, it was very
naturally exercised by the court of chancery as a branch of its
original jurisdiction."
In Aymar v. Roff 3 o a girl twelve years old had married in
- ignorance of the duties of that relation, considering the matter
a frolic. When she learned of the duties of marriage, she dis-
sented and wished to evade the consequences of her act. Her
father, as her next friend, brought a bill alleging these facts
and the court ordered that she be placed under its protection
as its ward and that the defendant, the husband, be restrained
from holding any conversation or having any intercourse with
her:3 1
The court, in the leading case of Stark v. Hamilton,3 2
might have based its decision upon this jurisdiction of equity
to secure and protect the rights of infants, but it did not do
so. In that case a man had debauched a minor girl and induced
her to live with him in a state of adultery and fornication and
was persisting in a continuance of such conduct. Would equity
afford the father of the girl a remedy by injunction? The court
held that equity had jurisdiction and enjoined the man from as-
sociating with the girl, and from communicating with her in
any way, either by writing, telephoning, telegraphing, or
through the aid and agency of any third person.
Instead of basing its jurisdiction upon the power of equity
103 U. S. 435, 26 L. ed. 580 (1881).
z 3 Johns. Oh. 49 (N. Y., 1817).
",See also, Butler v. Freeman, i'Ambl. 301, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (1856);
In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161 (1914); State v. Tineher, 25S
Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028 (1914); In re Pinney, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987
(1914).
149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919); aflirming 149 Ga. 44, 99 S. E.
40 (1919); commented on in 34 Har. L. Rev. 388, 412; 33 Har. L. Rev.
314; 19 Col. L. Rev. 413; 5 Corn. L. Q. 177; 18 M~ich. L. 335; 29
Yale L. 3. 344.
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to secure and protect the rights of infants, the court preferred
to consider its power to protect property rights and rights of
personality. It was proper for the court to rest its decision
upon the protection of these rights, if it desired to do so, but
it would have been far easier to have rested it upon its jurisdic-
tion to protect infants.
Apparently, this is another case where the court was will-
ing to protect personality, as such. But the case involved, as
the court suggested, both personal and property rights. The
property right involved, the right of the father to have his
children reside in his home with his family and to enjoy the
comfort of their association and the benefit of their services, is
well recognized. The interference of the defendant with this
right was an interference with a right of property of the father,
and equity had jurisdiction to give the father protection.
Having gained jurisdiction to protect this property right, it
could retain jurisdiction to give full relief to the father, which
might include a protection of personality.
But the court disapproved of giving protection to person-
ality in this indirect manner, saying,
"It is difficult to understand why injunctive protection of a mere
property right should be placed above similar protection from the
continual humiliation of the father aid the reputation of the family.
In some instances the former may be adequately compensated in
damages, but the latter is irreparable; for no mere money considera-
tion could restore the good name and reputation of the family or
palliate the humiliation of the father for the continual debauching of
his daughter."' O
Apparently, the injuncti6n here is not for the protection
of the property right involved, as in Vanderbilt v. Mfitchell,34
but rather for the protection of the personal rights involved,
which seemed to predominate in the mind of the court.35 Like
Ez parte Warfield,36 the case is weakened by state code provis-
ions, which give extended jurisdiction to equity, if interpreted
by a liberal court.
The case is interesting as indicating an additional way for
courts of equity to. protect the rights of infants. Aymar '.
2Ibid. 862.
Supra n. 2.
"'Such is the opinion of Durfee, Progress of the Law, 34 Har. L.
Rev. 388, 412. See also 5 Corn. L. Q. 177, 180.
Supra n. 4.
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Roff T illustrates that equity has jurisdiction under a delega-
tion of authority from the state as parens pat riae. Stark v.
Hamilton3s illustrates a second manner of acquiring jarisdic-
tion by equity-to protect the father's interest in his child's
services-a property right. Possibly it also illustrates a third
manner of acquiring jurisdiction-to protect personality, where
there is not an adequate remedy at law.
In Ex parte Badger3 9 the court considered all of these
grounds for obtaining jurisdiction to protect infants. The facts
of the case are particularly revolting. The husband, the de-
fendant, had become infatuated with a nurse, known to be with-
out chareter. lie had broken with his wife and set up a home,
plaeing this woman in charge as his mistress, over his children.
The wife filed a bill in equity asking for maintenance and cus-
tody of the children. A decree was rendered in her favor. Upon
refusal of the husband to comply with the decree, he was ad-
judged guilty of contempt and imprisoned. He then brought aproceeding in habeas corpus alleging that the equity court had
not had jurisdiction to determine and award the custody of
minor children. It was held that the court had jurisdiction.
There is language in the opinion that would indicate that
this court, as did the one in Stark v. Hamilton,40 considered that
equity has jurisdiction to protect personal rights as such, where
the remedy at law is inadequate. The effect of this language is
lessened, however, by the fact that the trial court had considered
and disposed, of property rights, as well as personal rights, of
the infants. In particular, the court relied upon its jurisdic-
tion to protect infants as a delegation of authority from the state
as parens patriae. The court found that an infant's ownership
of property is not essential to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
Such jurisdiction is only obtained when the infant is a ward
of the court, but "it is not necessary that it be a public charge,
or that the purpose of the proceeding be to so declare it; .
it becomes the ward of the court when it is brought before it for
any purpose; and any proceeding or application in equity re-
lating directly to the infant is sufficient." The effect of this
7Supra n. 30.
Supra n. 32.
286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936, 14 A. L. R. 286 (1920).
Supra n. 32.
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language is far-reaching. The result of it is that, although the
bill may be filed by the father or the mother of the infant, ask-
ing for such relief as the parent's right to the child's services
may make him entitled to, the mere filing of the bill brings the
infant under the jurisdiction of equity to protect, as its ward.
This result causes the best interests of the infant to come first
-even before the interests of its father and mother. This is
proper.
It is possible then, for equity to obtain jurisdiction of in-
fants upon any one of three grounds. First, as a delegation of
authority from the state as parens patriae. Second, to protect
any rights of property which may be involved, if the remedy
at law is inadequate. Third, to protect personal rights of the
infant if the remedy at law is not adequate, and the court is
liberal-minded enough to consider it has jurisdiction to do so.
At the present stage of the progress of the law on this question,
this would be highly conjectural. The first ground, long ac-
cepted as a legitimate ground for equity taking jurisdiction in
this type of cases, is considered by the writer as the best of the
three.
III. CONCLUSION
Cases involving the use of the injunction to regulate
family relations are not particularly helpful in considering
the general probem of whether or not equity has juris-
diction to protect purely personal rights. In Vanderbilt v.
MiteheU,4 1 it was not difficult to find a property right on which
to base the jurisdiction of equity to render relief. In the other
husband and wife cases discussed, the right to consortium or
the interest in the marital status should have been sufficient to
furnish property rights to be protected. In spite of strong dicta
in several of these cases, it is doubtful if any of them, -with the
possible exceptions of Ex parte Warfield 42 and Witte v. Baud-
erer 4 3 protect purely personal rights as such. And these cases,
giving full effect to the language of the opinions, are weakened
by the facts that a state statute gives equity extended jurisdic-
tion in Texas and that it was unnecessary to protect personal
rights as such, in order to give relief in these two cases. But as-
4Supra n. 2.
4Supra n. 4.
Supra n. 26. See also 24 Col. L. Rev. 431; 37 Har. L. Rev. 770.
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suming this negative result to be true, one cannot escape the
conclusion that the Texas cases and persuasive dicta in certain
of the other ones will assist in pointing the way to a further
extension of the rule that equity protects only property rights.
Nor is it necessary for the courts in cases involving infants
to consider whether they will extend the rule that equity pro-
tects only property rights in order to get jurisdiction to protect
personal rights of infants. Equity does not have to consider
this problem in order to get jurisdiction to regulate and control
their personal rights. Such jurisdiction, a delegation of author-
ity from the state as parens patriae, equity has long enjoyed as
an exception to the historic rule. Cburts which have chosen
not to rely on this exception, have been able to find a prop-
erty right on which to base jurisdiction, a protection of the
parent's right to the services of the child. Some courts, as in
Stark v. Hamilton 44 and Ex parte Badger,45 show an inclina-
tion to extend the rule that equity protects only property rights.
Although both of these cases contained property rights to be
protected, the strong language on the protection of personal
rights, as such, will be helpful to subsequent courts of equity,
which desire to further extend the rule.
Following the analysis herein, it would appear that equity
has jurisdiction to protect family relations. In the husband and
wife cases, the remedy at law is not adequate, and a property
right on which to ground the injunction can be found if the
court does not care to protect personal rights, as such. But
although equity has jurisdiction, it is concluded that it is gen-
erally expedient to grant injunctions in such cases. While the
decree can be enforced by the usual contempt proceedings, its
beneficial results and good policy are doubtful. Since the court
has jurisdiction, the injunction could issue in a particular case,
"but a wise chancellor, it is believed, would rarely exercise the
power." 46 However, in the infant cases the jurisdiction should
be exercised when at all necessary to provide for the protection
of those who need the aid of the court.




"Frederick C. Woodward, 19 I1. L. Rev. 587, 588.
